"With Me, It's All er Nuthin"':Formalism in
Law and Morality*
Larry Alexandert
My thesis is simple: Law is essentially formalistic, and morality is not in the slightest degree formalistic. My plan to establish this thesis is as follows: In Part I, I define what I mean by
formalism. In Part II, I present my argument for why law is essentially formalistic. I maintain that the problem law is meant to
solve is that of information, not immoral motivation-that men
are not gods, rather than that men are not angels. To solve this
problem, law must consist of determinate rules. Standards are
unhelpful. And theories of law such as the "justice-seeking Constitution" or other heavily moralized versions of constitutional or
statutory interpretation recreate the very problem law is meant
to solve.
In Part Ill, I identify the basic dilemma that formalistic law
presents and then canvass various methods that have been advanced as solutions to that dilemma. The dilemma raises the
question whether formalism, and hence law, is a possibility for
fully rational agents who understand its nature. In Part IV, I
turn to morality. Here, in opposition to a thesis recently advanced
by Leo Katz,' I argue that formalism is completely absent from
morality, despite some appearances to the contrary. Deontological
side constraints are not formalistic rules and do not function as
such. Finally, in Part V, I raise not the question whether formalistic law is possible-the problem of Part IH-but the question
whether formalistic law is by its very nature a violation of deontological side constraints. I conclude that law may turn out to be
a moral possibility only for consequentialists.

* From Richard Rodgers and Oscar Hammerstein 11, All er Nuthin', in Oklahoma!
(Williamson Music 1943), reprinted in Six Plays by Rodgers and Hammerstein 7, 66-67
(Random House 1959).
t Warren Distinguished Professor, University of San Diego School of Law. I would like
to thank Emily Sherwin for her many contributions to this project and the participants
and audience at the Symposium FormalismRevisited for their helpful comments.
1 Leo Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains:Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud,and Kindred Puzzles of the
Law (Chicago 1996).
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I. WHAT Is FORMALISM?

I can be brief here. By formalism I mean adherence to a
norm's prescription without regard to the background reasons the
norm is meant to serve (even when the norm's prescription fails
to serve those background reasons in a particular case). A formalist looks to the form of a prescription-that it is contained in
an authoritative rule-rather than to the substantive end or ends
that it was meant to achieve. A norm is formalistic when it is
opaque in the sense that we act on it without reference to the
substantive goals that underlie it.'
II. WHY LAW Is ESSENTIALLY FORMALISTIC

In a forthcoming book, Emily Sherwin and I make the following case for the moral function of formal rules.'
A. The Circumstances of Law
1.

Disagreement, uncertainty, and
authoritative settlement.

Imagine a small community whose members have roughly
similar views about their moral rights and obligations. At least,
their views are fairly similar if we characterize them at a high
level of generality. Thus, they generally agree that innocent lives
should not be taken, that property rights should be respected,
that promises ordinarily should be kept, that undue risks to others should be avoided, and that everyone should contribute a fair
share to support actions necessary for the common good. In other
words, they agree about moral rights and duties at the level of
abstraction at which you, the readers, tend to agree with each

' Formalism as I am defining it-strict adherence to the prescriptions of norms without regard to the substantive goals those norms are meant to achieve-must be distinguished from something else that often goes by the name "formalism" but that I would call
"conceptualism." A conceptualist is one who believes that specific norms can be deduced
from the form of various transactions. Thus, for example, a conceptualist might maintain
that a "tort," by virtue ofits nature, must of necessity be governed by a fault standard and
cannot be governed by norms chosen, say, to advance allocative efficiency or distributive
justice. The sense offormalism that I am invoking here is not that of the conceptualists, as
I understand them. See, for example, Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationalityof Law, 97 Yale L J 949, 951 (1988) ("Formalism postulates that law is intelligible as an internally coherent phenomenon."). For an excellent account of formalism
qua conceptualism, see Stephen R. Perry, Professor Weinrib's Formalism: The Not-SoEmpty Sepulchre, 16 Harv J L & Pub Pol 597 (1993).
Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin, Past Imperfect: Rules, Principles,and the Dilemmas ofLaw ch 5 (Duke forthcoming 1999).
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other. In addition, imagine not that everyone in this community
is a saint, but that everyone will honor his moral obligations as
he sees them almost all the time. In other words, the members of
this community are strongly motivated to act morally toward one
another.
This community so far sounds pretty idyllic. Nonetheless, as
favorably situated as this community is in terms of general moral
agreement and good will, it lacks something necessary to prevent
ruinous discord. It lacks authoritative rules.
Let me explain. I have said that the members of this community generally agree about the content of their moral rights and
duties at a high level of abstraction. Yet as the moral questions
become more specific-Does a fetus have a moral right not to be
aborted? Should one be liable for causing an accident without regard to fault? Should a contractual obligation be extinguished
when the purpose of the contract has been frustrated? Should resources be divided so as to reflect differences in welfare? and so
on-they begin to disagree.4
Moreover, even when they agree about the formulation of
moral rights and duties, they might disagree about the facts that
govern when and how those moral rights and duties apply. For
example, although they may agree that no one should put dangerous pollutants in the water supply, they may disagree over
whether a certain pesticide is a dangerous pollutant. Or, if they
agree that those in irreversible comas should be regarded as
"dead," they may disagree over whether a certain physical condition constitutes an irreversible coma.
These disagreements can produce considerable strife and
turmoil, even among people of good will. Indeed, the road to the
nasty, brutish, and short lives of the Hobbesian state of nature
does not require people motivated solely by selfishness and
predatory opportunism. Moral disagreement over concrete
courses of conduct, coupled with the motivation to do the right
thing, can lead to the Hobbesian state of affairs as expeditiously
as naked self-interest.
What my otherwise rather favorably situated community
needs to avert these bleak prospects is a method for resolving
these concrete moral disagreements and uncertainties authorita-

' Of course, in real communities, people often agree about what ought to be done in
concrete cases even though they disagree about abstract principles. See, for example, Cass
R. Sunstein, Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 Harv L Rev 1733, 1735-36 (1995).
When there is such concrete agreement, the community does not require authoritative settlements, which means that it does not require law.
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tively. That is, the community needs the capability for authoritative settlement.
The term "authoritative settlement" is something of a redundancy. The function of practical authority is precisely to settle the
question of what ought to be done. And settlement requires that
those for whom the answer is supposed to settle the question
treat the answer as authoritative-that is, as if it is correct. Once
the question is settled, those who want to know what to do need
only consult the terms of settlement. They no longer need to debate the reasons behind those terms. Moreover, not only are they
no longer required to consult the reasons behind the settlement
in determining how to act, they are also required not to heed
those reasons even if, from their perspective, those reasons conflict with the terms of the settlement. Given that the objective is
a settlement, its terms must be authoritative, which means that
the terms must supplant the reasons upon which they are based.'
Let me illustrate the previous paragraph with an example.
Suppose Paul operates a factory that dumps a certain chemical
byproduct into the river. Paula, a downstream water user, believes that the chemical is a dangerous pollutant and wants Paul
to stop the dumping. Paul agrees that he has a moral obligation
to Paula not to dump dangerous chemicals in the river, but he
denies that the chemical is dangerous. Suppose now there is an
authoritative settlement of the moral question in dispute, and the
answer it gives is that Paul is obligated not to dump that particular chemical. If Paul must decide whether he may continue
dumping, he need only consult the terms of the authoritative settlement, which will tell him that he may not. He may continue to
believe that the reasons behind the settlement-the dangerousness of the chemical-point to a different result. If the settlement
is truly authoritative, however, he will not believe that he may
still act on those reasons. The settlement has supplanted them in
his decisionmaking.
Without authoritative settlements, community members
disagree or are uncertain about such matters as how fast they
should drive, when they are relieved from their contractual obligations, and how much they should each contribute toward the
support of the community's poor. If Agnes believes one should
drive fifty-five miles per hour and on the left side of the road, but
Ben believes one should drive seventy-five and on the right, seri-

s See Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law: Essays on Law and Morality 24-25, 30-33
(Clarendon 1979); Joseph Raz, Authority and Justification, 14 Phil & Pub Aff 3, 10 (1985);
Joseph Raz, Authority, Law and Morality, 68 Monist 295, 297 (1985).
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ous collisions are likely to result. If Alfred believes that Victor is
in an irreversible coma and should be taken off life support, so
that the resources used to support him can be used to help others,
but Bertha believes that Victor is not in an irreversible coma,
Bertha might feel obligated to use force to prevent Alfred from
disconnecting Victor. Finally, if Paul mistakenly believes that
mercury is not harmful to the water supply, he might be tempted
to dump mercury in a river and avoid the costs of an alternative
means of disposal. Even if community members do not disagree
about morality at an abstract level, concrete disagreements and
uncertainties about particular moral principles and factual matters result in the types of disagreements and uncertainties just
described. And those disagreements and uncertainties are potentially quite destructive.
Authoritative settlement solves the problems of coordination,
expertise, and efficiency. As I am using the term, a coordination
problem is any cost that results from moral disagreement or from
uncertainty about how others will resolve questions about what
they are morally permitted, required, or forbidden to do. Agnes's
and Ben's opinions on how to drive may be equally sound, and yet
if their opinions differ, and if they are free to act as they see fit,
disaster will follow.6 Alfred and Bertha's disagreement over the
status of Victor leads to a coordination problem because it may
result in "moral combat.'
Moral combat is a coordination problem, as are attempts by
agents to undertake mutually incompatible actions. So, too, are
all the costs of upset expectations and the costs incurred to avoid
these costs. These latter costs are frequently referred to under
the headings of reliance and predictability. I view them as a genus of the species coordination problems.
Any authoritative settlement can solve coordination problems. Declaring Victor to be-or not to be-in an irreversible
coma solves Alfred and Bertha's coordination problem. Likewise,
declaring the rules of the road to include a fifty-five miles per
' It should be apparent-and so I will not address it at length-that these coordination, expertise, and efficiency problems will arise even in a society all of whose members
accept the same basic social morality, and even if that social morality is extremely libertarian. Even in a Nozickian Utopia, where everyone accepts Nozick's libertarian principles
and desires to comply with them, human fallibility regarding knowledge of the world together with differing reasonable interpretations of Nozick's abstract principles would give
rise to coordination and expertise problems under the best of realistic assumptions, as
Nozick himself recognized. See Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia 96-101 (Basic
Books 1974). See also Jonathan Wolff, Anarchism and Skepticism, in John T. Sanders and
Jan Narveson, eds, ForandAgainst the State 99, 111-14 (Rowman & Littlefield 1996).
' See Heidi M. Hurd, Moral Combat (forthcoming Cambridge 1999).
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hour speed limit and driving on the right solves Agnes' and Ben's
coordination problem-though perhaps no better than a rule of
seventy-five miles per hour speed limit and driving on the left.
Sometimes the problem is exclusively one of coordination, and all
that is needed to solve it is an authoritative settlement, whatever
its terms.'
Usually, however, there are better and worse ways of settling
matters. There is a fact of the matter about whether Victor is in
an irreversible coma. There are costs and benefits associated with
the choice of a speed limit. In these circumstances, a good solution calls not only for coordination but also for expertise. As for
Paul dumping mercury, there is no coordination problem at all.
Rather, the problem is Paul's lack of expertise.
Thus, the second benefit produced by authoritative settlements is a reduction in individual decisionmaking error through
the authoritative decisionmaker's greater moral and factual expertise. If there are persons in the community whose moral and
factual expertise is greater than that of others, then having them
authoritatively settle disagreements and uncertainties about
what ought to be done solves both the coordination and expertise
problems.9
' Sometimes it is said that authoritative settlement is necessary for solving Prisoners'
Dilemmas. There are two points I want to make about Prisoners' Dilemmas. First, they do
not require narrowly self-interested actors. Perfect altruists can face Prisoners' Dilemmas.
For example, suppose Altruist One is faced with the choice whether to take a short cut
across the grass. If he takes the short cut, he can spend five more minutes with his sick
aunt, which will bring her pleasure. He also knows, however, that Altruists Two and
Three face the same choice, and that if two cross the grass to spend more time with their
sick aunts, the grass will be killed, which will be a greater loss to others than the aunts'
gain. If only one crosses the grass, however, the grass will not be killed. Altruists One
through Three face an "Altruists' Dilemma" that is parallel to standard Prisoners' Dilemmas. See Frederic Schick, Making Choices: A Recasting of Decision Theory 96 (Cambridge
1997); Wayne Eastman, Telling Alternative Stories: Heterodox Versions of the Prisoners'
Dilemma, the Coase Theorem, and Supply-Demand Equilibrium,29 Con L Rev 727, 76667 (1997).
Second, the problem in both types of dilemmas is coordination. In this respect, however, Prisoners' and Altruists' Dilemmas are no different from the coordination problem
faced by Agnes and Ben. Therefore, I shall not treat these dilemmas separately from the
general topic of solving coordination problems.
' Many writers have emphasized the coordination function of authoritative rules. See
Tom D. Campbell, The Legal Theory of Ethical Positivism 6, 50-51, 53, 58 (Dartmouth
1996); Jules Coleman, Authority and Reason, in Robert P. George, ed, The Autonomy of
Law: Essays on Legal Positivism 287, 304-05 (Clarendon 1996); Neil MacCormick, The
Concept of Law and The Concept of Law, in George, ed, The Autonomy of Law 163, 182;
Mark C. Murphy, Surrenderof Judgment and the Consent Theory ofPoliticalAuthority, 16
Law & Phil 115, 125-27 (1997); Gerald J. Postema, Law's Autonomy andPublic Practical
Reason, in George, ed, The Autonomy of Law 79, 89-93; Gerald J. Postema, Coordination
and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J Legal Stud 165 (1982); Raz, 14 Phil &
Pub Aff at 17 (cited in note 5); Frederick Schauer, Playing By The Rules 137-45, 162-66
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Finally, a third benefit produced by authoritative settlements
is a reduction in decisionmaking costs. Even if members of the

community could, through lengthy deliberations, arrive at coordinated and correct decisions, the moral costs in terms of time and
other resources devoted to such deliberations might outweigh the
moral gains. Only settlement by some means or another keeps us
from potentially squandering all of our resources on deliberating
about what to do, much in the manner of Buridan's Ass.'0 In other
words, authoritative settlement is efficient."
2.

Achieving authoritative settlements: The first steps.

I have shown why our imagined community needs authoritative settlements of moral disagreements. Lack of coordination
and expertise threaten deterioration into a Hobbesian nightmare
despite the general similarity of members' moral views and their
willingness to act on moral reasons. 2 But how does authoritative
settlement get started? Necessity on its own will not generate

solutions.
The requisite first step is for the members of the community
to agree that they need ways of authoritatively settling their
moral controversies. The logical next step is for them to designate
someone as the authoritative settler. Suppose, for example, that
they all agree that Lex has proven in the past to possess the rea-soning ability and the knowledge to resolve moral controversies
well. They might then all accept the following rule: "Let Lex de-

(Clarendon 1991). Many have also pointed out the expertise function that makes the
choice of the authority, in addition to the choice that there be an authority, important.
See, for example, Schauer, Playingby the Rules at 150-52, 158-59; Coleman, Authority and
Reason at 305.
" For example, suppose "Drive seventy-five on the left" is slightly preferable to "Drive
fifty-five on the right." And suppose that, if Agnes and Ben deliberate for a long time and
consult enough other people, they will both arrive at the conclusion that they should drive
seventy-five on the left. Nevertheless, the net cost of their deliberations may exceed the
net gain over the rule "Drive fifty-five on the right." Without the rule as an authoritative
settlement of how they ought to drive, they will have to deliberate. And because they do
not know in advance where deliberation will lead them and what the stakes are, they will
keep on deliberating until they reach a decision, even if the costs of deliberation exceed
the gains. Once a deliberative cost is sunk, it provides no reason against continuing to deliberate. For an explanation of Buridan's Ass, see Columbia Nitrogen Corp v Struthers
Wells Corp, 307 F Supp 281, 282 (S D Ga 1969).
" See Campbell, The Legal Theory at 57 (cited in note 9); Schauer, Playing by the
Rules at 14549 (cited in note 9).
" A good analogy would be to an army attempting to operate with no chain of command. An army requires coordination to execute battle plans. And because not every battle plan is equally good, it requires expertise in selecting among them. That is why armies
have chains of command and why they attempt in choosing generals to find people with
strategic expertise.
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cide (authoritatively settle) our moral controversies." And let us
suppose further that Lex begins his work by resolving Agnes and
Ben's conflict and issuing the following rule: "The speed limit
shall be fifty-five miles per hour."
Notice that at this point in our story, we have two rules. The
first rule--"Let Lex decide"--exists because the members of the
community agree to its terms. That is, its existence is based on
community members' acceptance of it as normative. 3
The second rule-- Drive fifty-five"--exists because it has
been posited by someone with authority to settle moral controversies, Lex. The posited rule has authority to settle moral controversies because its promulgator, Lex, does. And he has authority
because the society accepts a rule to that effect. 4
"SThis acceptance by society of the rule "Let Lex decide" can obviously vanish at any
moment. In other words, Lex's status as the authoritative settler of moral controversies
and queries depends from moment to moment on his being regarded as such. There is no
privileged moment of such acceptance; therefore, if Lex at any time ceases to be regarded
as authoritative, he will cease to be authoritative. The fact that he was authoritative at
one time will make no difference to his present authority.
" Before I continue down the path toward a more elaborate set of rules and more complications, I wish to comment on a point that might be nagging some readers: If the members of this community are plagued by a predictable degree of moral disagreement, how
could they agree that Lex has greater moral expertise than anyone else? In other words, if,
in the realm of moral expertise, "it takes one to know one,' will not the community's moral
disagreements preclude agreement on the rule, "Let Lex decide?
I think that, so long as the basic moral intuitions of the members are not wildly disparate, there is a reasonable likelihood that they will be able to agree on relative moral expertise despite their moral disagreements. In other domains one can identify experts
through experience without becoming an expert oneself. For example, most people make
errors in reasoning about risks. See, for example, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman,
Availability: A heuristicfor judgngfrequency and probability,in Daniel Kahneman, Paul
Slovic, and Amos Tversky, eds, Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases 163
(Cambridge 1982). They can, however, be brought to understand their errors by others.
They will rightly regard those who consistently demonstrate their errors to them as experts in reasoning about risks. Yet, although these experts can bring others to understand
their mistakes, such understanding will not make those who were mistaken into experts
themselves. Left to their own devices, they will err again, and they realize that. That is
why they can identify those who point out their mistakes as experts and yet not be experts
themselves. Defects in moral judgment may be more difficult to demonstrate than defects
in risk assessment, yet moral expertise will often be recognizable with hindsight.
Moreover, even if members of our hypothetical community regard themselves as
equally expert in moral reasoning, they may agree that, when they themselves must decide what to do, they are subject to cognitive biases and errors that do not affect them to
nearly the same degree when they are deciding in a more disinterested posture what others ought to do. Thus, they might agree that anyone who is in the role of Lex will be more
morally expert than those facing decisions about how they should act, if for no other reason than the authority's greater degree of disinterest. (This point also suggests as a corollary that Lex's decisions might not be deemed authoritative regarding matters on which
Lex has a certain type of personal stake.)
For a thoughtful discussion of the problem of establishing authoritative institutions in
the face of moral uncertainty and disagreement, see Thomas B. McAffee, Substance Above
All: The Utopian Vision of Modern NaturalLaw Constitutionalists,4 S Cal Interdiscip L J
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Achieving authoritative settlements:
Some complications.

Let us imagine that Lex is capable of moving from moral dispute to moral query, resolving them as they arise. If so, Lex need
not resolve general moral questions; he need only resolve the particular dispute or question before him. Thus, Lex can tell Paul
that Paul may or may not dump a particular pollutant in a particular river without deciding more. Lex need not resolve more
general potential controversies because he can resolve particular
manifestations of those general controversies and questions. Of
course, to resolve particular controversies, Lex will perforce employ general moral and empirical principles. The point is that he
need not resolve authoritatively any issue that is broader than
the specific controversy he confronts.
Nor will there be problems in interpreting Lex's resolutions.
For if the disputants misunderstand Lex's pronouncement on
their dispute, Lex can correct them immediately. Of course, at
some level Lex must be able to communicate his resolution to
them; he could not function as a practical authority if his resolutions of moral controversies and questions were completely
opaque to the rest of the society. If he is always on the scene,
however, then the chances of failure of communication are minimized; Lex can fine-tune his formulations whenever he perceives
that they are being misunderstood.
These two points-the specificity of Lex's resolutions and his
ability to minimize misunderstandings of them-follow from
Lex's being at the scene of each moral controversy or question. It
is easy to see, however, why this method of resolving particular
moral disputes and queries will not prove satisfactory once a
community becomes sufficiently populous or far-flung. Indeed,
even in a small community, with, say, a few hundred people living in a relatively small area, Lex's resolution of moral issues in
this way will run into difficulties. Lex may die or become incapacitated. Or he may be distant from the location where the decision must be made and thus unavailable for consultation within
the necessary time frame.
With respect to Lex's possible death or incapacity, the community will perceive that it needs a rule to take account of that
contingency (indeed, with regard to death, inevitability). So the
community might agree to a broader rule than "Let Lex decide,"
such as "Let Lex or Lex's designated substitute or successor de-

501, 516-21 (1995).
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cide." Alternatively, this broader rule might not be agreed upon
by the community but might instead be promulgated by Lex. In
the first case, the rule's authority derives from social agreement
on its terms. In the second case, the rule's authority derives from
Lex's authority, which in turn derives from social agreement on
"Let Lex decide." In both cases, however, the broader rule
authoritatively settles the issue of who, in the absence of Lex, can
take over Lex's function and authoritatively settle controversies
over what morally ought be done.
To solve his inability to be present at the scene of each moral
controversy, Lex could promulgate rules that are more general
than the controversies and questions already resolved. Lex could
thus anticipate and resolve controversies and questions that have
not yet arisen. Indeed, Lex's resolution of Agnes and Ben's speed
limit dispute-"Drive fifty-five"--goes far beyond resolution of the
specific controversy between Agnes and Ben.
Of course, when Lex promulgates general rules to govern
controversies and questions that have not yet arisen, there is a
danger that he will not foresee the range of future circumstances
very clearly, and that accordingly his rules will subsequently
prove inapt. I have said that Lex is perceived by the community
to be a moral expert, but that does not mean that he is or is perceived to be omniscient. To be realistic, we must assume fallibility, not just in Lex's motivation, but much more importantly for
our purposes, in his knowledge and foresight. Moreover, even if
Lex could somehow foresee every dispute that might arise, he
could not draft a rule that would correctly resolve them all and be
at the same time reasonably accessible to actors."
We can see now that despite the extreme simplicity of this
hypothetical social situation, the set of authoritative rules required for coordination, expertise, and efficiency will have a certain degree of complexity. Beyond the rule establishing Lex as the
An exception is a rule that solves a coordination problem by selecting one of several
equally attractive options.
Of course, many of the controversies Lex must settle will be quite specific. Even if Lex
has promulgated the rule "Do not dump mercury in the river," Alex may disagree with
Sue, who lives downstream, about whether a particular substance he plans to dump is
mercury. Clarifying the general moral principle that enjoins creating excessive risks by
means of rules such as "Do not dump mercury in the river" will go some distance toward
resolving moral controversy, but it will not eliminate it if there is controversy over the
facts to which such rules apply. So Lex will have to decide factual disputes as well as
promulgate general rules. Further, because he cannot be present at the scene of every dispute, he must promulgate general rules for how factual disputes are to be resolved and, in
the event these "adjudicatory rules" cannot be applied withbut conffict, designate other
persons as having the authority to resolve factual disputes.
S
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authority-a rule- based on its social acceptance-there will be
rules promulgated by Lex that (1) will range from the general
("Do not dump dangerous pollutants") to the more specific ("Do
not dump mercury") to the very specific ("Do not dump this substance here now") and (2) will designate other persons as authorities for certain questions (such as adjudications) or authorities
under certain conditions (such as Lex's unavailability)."
Finally, Lex's inability to be present at the scene of every
dispute means that Lex will not be able instantaneously to correct misunderstandings of the rules he has promulgated. Suppose
Agnes or Ben is unclear whether "Drive fifty-five" applies in rainy
weather, or refers to kilometers rather than miles, or concerns
aircraft as well as cars. So long as Lex is on the scene, he can
clarify these matters. If he is not on the scene, however, it might
be useful to have available some rules for how to interpret Lex's
rules. And these rules must be part of the rules constituting (and
perhaps establishing limits on) Lex as the authority' 7 -the part of
the community's rule of recognition, if you will; rules of interpretation cannot themselves be promulgated by Lex without a vicious regress."
B. Settlement Requisites and the Nature of Authoritative Rules
The previous Part established the need for authoritative settlement of disputes through the mechanism of a set of rules. This
Part addresses the following question: If the rule establishing Lex
as the authority and the rules Lex promulgates are to facilitate
" The continuity from the most general moral questions, such as, "What moral principle governs risk imposition?," to the most specific, such as, "May Alex dump the substance
here now?," is well-known to American constitutional lawyers. These lawyers must grapple with how specific a question must be to be deemed a question of adjudicative fact as
opposed to a question of legislative fact. The former must be determined in adjudicatory
proceedings, whereas the latter need not be. See Bi-Metallic Investment Co v Colorado
State Board, 239 US 441, 445 (1915) (finding no right to an adjudicatory hearing prior to
the issuance of a general administrative order similarly affecting many individuals); Londoner v City and County of Denver, 210 US 373, 386 (1908) (voiding tax assessment affecting only a particular handful of individuals because they were denied a prior adjudicative hearing). Lex might decide that certain persons and procedures work best for totally
factual questions, whereas others are best for devising more general rules, which are less
fact-dependent the more general they are.
Finally, Lex may devise rules about to what degree these various rules should be entrenched against future change. He might decide that he should be minimally restrained
in changing the most general rules, but he should never change--or rarely change-specific adjudications.
" See Larry Alexander, All or Nothing At All? The Intentions, Authorities and the
Authority of Intentions, in Andre Marmor, ed, Law and Interpretation 357 (Clarendon
1995).
" For how would the rule promulgating interpretive rules itself be interpreted?
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coordination, prevent error, and obviate the necessity of cost ineffective deliberation, what features must they possess?
1.

Norm types: Posited rules versus moral principles.

My focus is on rules that are practical (prescriptive) norms
and thus can be obeyed or violated, what I call "serious rules."'9
Serious rules contain a factual predicate or hypothesis and a prescription.' For example, the rule 'Do not dump pollutants in the
river" can be roughly recast as "If you are considering dumping
pollutants in the river (hypothesis), don't do it (prescription)."
The most important characteristic of a serious rule, as I use the
term, is that it purports to state a prescription applicable to every
case that falls within the rule's factual predicate or hypothesis.
There are all sorts of practical norms. One major division is
between, on the one hand, those norms that are posited by human beings and thus come into existence at particular times and
places, and, on the other hand, those norms that are not so posited. The latter nonposited norms I shall refer to throughout as
"moral principles." I use the term "principles" rather than "rules"
to avoid confusion. Whenever I refer to a "rule," I shall be referring to a posited rule, not a moral one.
By contrasting posited rules with moral principles, I am
taking a particular position neither on the metaphysics of morality-the reality to which moral propositions refer-nor on the
content of morality. Whatever we think morality is-whether it is
a realm of moral fact in the external world, a projection of sentiments onto the external world, or a purely emotional response to
the world-and whatever we think its content is, all I need to assume is that moral principles do not exist by virtue of being pos-

' The term "rule" has many meanings in ordinary usage. It should be relatively clear
that as I am using the term, most of those meanings are inapplicable. I am, for example,
referring to norms that guide conduct. Thus, empirical generalizations, such as, "As a rule,
most tigers are yellow," or, "As a rule, the male bird will fly away before the female bird,"
although surely rules of a sort, are not the kinds of rules with which I am concerned. See
Schauer, Playingby the Rules at 17-18 (cited in note 9) (discussing the distinction between
prescriptive and descriptive rules). My interest is in normative rules, not descriptive or
predictive rules.
Nor am I concerned with what some have called "rules of thumb" or "summary rules."
See id at 4-5, 104-05 (discussing rules of thumb); John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64
Phil Rev 3, 19-24 (1955) (discussing the "summary view" of rules). Such "rules" offer practical advice, but they are not practical norms. Examples of such "soft" advisory rules are
"As a rule, you should drive slowly rather than drive fast," and, "As a rule, you should engage in organic farming." Because these "rules" are not practical norms but are only advisory, they can be heeded or ignored, but they can never be "obeyed" or "violated."
See Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 23 (cited in note 9).
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ited by particular persons at particular times and particular
places.
2.

Norm types: Characteristics of serious rules.

Posited norms are not all alike in terms of their capacity to
determine what ought to be done. If Lex is to perform his function
as a practical authority, his norms must be general, determinate,
and efficient. The need for general norms results from Lex's limited capacity for resolving uncertainties as they arise.
In the absence of general norms, decisionmaking must be
2 Particularistic decisionmaking means reasoning
particularistic.
directly from moral principles to particular decisions-such as
how fast Agnes should drive now or whether Paul ought to dump
this substance in this river now. Particularistic decisionmaking is
the decisionmaking that members of our hypothetical community
engaged in before they adopted the rule "Let Lex decide," and the
costs of particularistic decisionmaking in terms of coordination,
expertise, and efficiency are precisely what led them to adopt that
rule.
So long as Lex can decide each particular question and controversy as it arises-that is, so long as Lex can, by engaging in
particularistic decisionmaking, bring about coordinated, efficient,
and morally proper decisions by the rest of the community-the
need for decisionmaking under rules does not arise. Or rather, to
be precise, the members of the community follow one rule--"Let
Lex decide"-each application of which is guided very particularistically by Lex himself.
But, as I said, Lex will be unable to be present at each moment when a decision involving moral principles must be made
and when the application of those principles is controverted or
misunderstood. Lex therefore must anticipate such decisions and
settle in advance what should be done in those cases through
promulgating general norms-norms applicable to a range of
cases that share common features.
Generality is a matter of degree, of course. Rules can range
from the most particular ("Drive this speed now"), to the more
general ('Drive fifty-five so long as the weather is dry, the road
has a shoulder, it is after sunup and before sundown, etc."), to the
quite general ('Drive fifty-five").2 2 Yet to serve Lex's purposes, the
norms he promulgates must be general enough to take the place
of Lex himself
See id at 77-78.
See id at 18-21 (discussing the levels of generality of descriptions).
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Lex's norms must also be "rules," in the sense of posited general norms that settle determinately the questions and controversies that arise in the application of moral principles. Suppose, for
example, that Agnes and Ben are trying to decide how fast they
should drive and they take their concern to Lex. They will not be
satisfied if Lex promulgates any of the following "rules" in response: "Drive at a reasonable speed"; 'Drive safely"; "Drive so as
to maximize total social utility"; or "Drive consistently with
maximum equal liberty for all." They will say to Lex, "If we knew
what was safe, or reasonable, or utility maximimizing, and so
forth, we would not need to have you settle how fast we should
drive; we could decide for ourselves and achieve coordination, expertise, and efficiency." In other words, these posited norms do
not settle for Agnes and Ben the particular question they need to
have settled in order to coordinate desirably and efficiently.
Typically, norms like "drive reasonably" and the others described above are called standards.' Standards are posited norms
that contain vague or controversial moral or evaluative terms in
their hypotheses. Persons attempting to conform to standards
must be able to resolve for themselves the application of these
terms. If Agnes and Ben require an authority like Lex-because
they cannot resolve for themselves efficiently, expertly, and consistently the applications of the moral principles to which they
both subscribe at a more abstract level-then they will not be
helped by Lex's promulgating standards. For the standards do
not improve their ability to determine what they need to determine.
Nor will standards be any more helpful if they point to determinate factual matters as considerations or "factors." For example, Lex might promulgate the norm "Drive reasonably, taking
into account the weather, visibility, traffic, and condition of the
road." The difficulty is that, in order to decide what is reasonable
in light of these factors, Agnes and Ben will most likely still need
to resolve how to apply abstract moral principles in concrete
situations-the problem that led them to seek Lex's determination in the first place.
Things are somewhat improved for Agnes and Ben if Lex
promulgates a slightly different norm, "Drive reasonably, considering only the weather, visibility, traffic, and condition of the
road." This norm, unlike the previous one, moves some distance
" See Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict 27-28 (Oxford 1996).
See also Larry Alexander, Incomplete Theorizing:A Reviewing Essay of Cass . Sunstein's
Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict, 72 Notre Dame L Rev 531, 541-44 (1997) (explaining and critiquing Sunstein's position on rules versus standards).
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from being a pure standard and toward being a "rule" as I am
using the term. For now Lex has told Agnes and Ben more than
they already knew. He has told them to ignore all factors that
they might think bear on reasonable behavior other than the four
mentioned. The part of the norm that can be translated as 'Do
not consider anything other than weather..." is a rule-like norm
coupled with a standard ("Drive reasonably").
The quality that identifies a "rule" and distinguishes it from
a "standard" is the quality of determinateness. A norm becomes a
rule when most people understand it in a similar way. When this
is so, the rule will give every affected individual the same answer
to unsettled moral questions and so bring about coordination. Although a standard is "transparent" to background moral principles and requires particularistic decisionmaking, rules can be applied without regard to questions of background morality. They
are opaque to the moral principles they are supposed to effectuate. Thus, a "rule" is a posited norm that fulfills the function of
posited norms, that is, settles questions of what ought to be done.
A pure rule is a posited norm that settles all questions about
what ought to be done that fall within its scope. For example, the
posited norm "Drive fifty-five" is a pure rule if it settles for each
driver in our community the otherwise unsettled question of how
fast he or she should drive. (A posited norm that settles some but
not all unsettled questions that fall within its scope--"Drive fiftyfive unless it is raining, in which case drive reasonably"-could
be called an impure rule.)
The determinateness requirement refers to the moral functions that rules are meant to serve: coordination, expertise, and
efficiency. The indeterminateness of how moral principles apply
to particular cases is what produces the controversy and uncertainty that result in lack of coordination, costly deliberation, and
mistaken (inexpert) conclusions. The purpose of having Lex
promulgate rules to settle questions about how moral principles
apply in concrete situations is to eliminate this controversy and
uncertainty and their associated moral costs. Lex's rules can perform this function only if they are relatively determinate for those
who must follow them. 4 In other words, it must be easier for the
members of the community to ascertain correctly what Lex's rules
require in concrete situations than it is for them to ascertain
what their moral principles require. Otherwise, the rules will
have failed to fulfill their moral function. Ideally, the rules should
" See Campbell, The Legal Theory at 118 (cited in note 9) (arguing that a good rule is
clear and specific).
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be fully determinate: everyone in the community should agree
about what the rules require in every case.
I have spoken thus far of generality and determinateness.
These are separate considerations: a quite specific rule can be either determinate ("Drive fifty-five on Wednesdays between two
and five") or indeterminate ("Do not dump 'unsafe' materials in
the Grand River this Monday"). Likewise, a very general rule can
be either determinate ("Drive fifty-five") or indeterminate ("Drive
safely").
Nonetheless, there is a tendency for generality and determinateness to go together. That is so because if Lex posits specific
rules, then although they may each be determinate, they will
have to be quite numerous to cover all the controversial or uncertain cases that likely will arise. And the presence of a lot of specific rules will create indeterminacy about what ought to be done
even if the individual rules are quite specific.'
So the desire for determinateness will tend to push Lex in
the direction of generality. So, too, will another consideration,
namely, Lex's inability to foresee all possible concrete applications of moral principles." Lex only will be able to anticipate concrete cases in terms of broader, more general, categories of cases.
Thus, his rules will handle cases in terms of the more general
categories that he can foresee.
Generality and determinateness enable rules to settle moral
questions and controversies. Of course, to fulfill their moral function, rules must not only settle moral questions, but also settle
them efficiently enough that the moral gains of coordination are
not exceeded by increased decisionmaking costs. A rule that produces coordination, where lack of coordination has modest moral
costs, but that requires each person to make a thousand timeconsuming and hence costly calculations, would be an undesirable
rule, despite its ability to settle disputed moral questions. (For
example, Drive fifty-five when the temperature is over 33 degrees Fahrenheit, and skies are sunny to partly cloudy, and it has
not rained for twenty-four hours; otherwise drive forty-five.")P
' The instructions for filing the tax return of a business are a good example. Although
the rules governing taxation might individually be quite determinate, there are so many of
them that ordinary taxpayers have difficulty figuring out what the rules in the aggregate
require. A prolix code of very specific rules can be so difficult to apply that it produces the
lack of coordination and inefficient decisionmaking that determinate rules are supposed to
remedy.
" Hart calls this rule making difficulty "indeterminacy of aim." H.LA Hart, The Concept ofLaw 125 (Clarendon 1961).
" A final desideratum of authoritative settlement is expertise. That is, we expect a
practical authority not only to settle unsettled moral questions, but to settle them well.
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The determinacy of rules and the question of
moral content.

I have said that, if Lex's rules are to serve their moral functions and foster more coordinated, morally more expert, and more
efficient decisionmaking, then their meaning-what they direct
members of the community to do in particular cases-must be determinate. Some believe that this determinacy requirement
means that Lex's rules cannot themselves refer to moral or
evaluative considerations, but must refer solely to factual matters. I think, however, that this position, although it is correct in
one sense, is incorrect in another and potentially quite misleading sense.
The position is surely correct in this sense: The application of
"rules" must not require members of the community to resolve
the very moral controversies and uncertainties that give rise to
the need for rules in the first place. If Lex's "rules" did this, then
they would really be standards and would leave everything as it
was.
On the other hand, suppose there are moral or evaluative
terms that all members of the community apply the same way
across a broad range of circumstances. Suppose, for example, that
Lex fashions a rule to deal with the effects on neighboring farms
of a farmer's methods of irrigation, plowing, crop rotation, and
spraying. And suppose that Lex's rule employs the phrase "the
reasonable farmer." Finally, suppose that in our hypothetical
community, everyone agrees about how "the reasonable farmer"
irrigates, plows, and so forth in almost every conceivable situation. In such a case, Lex's rule-which we may assume is meant
to settle some other moral controversy, such as whether "reasonable farmers" should nonetheless be liable for damages they
cause adjoining farms -- will be determinate and capable of performing its moral function despite its use of an evaluative term.'
Obviously, a rule can bring about coordination and efficient decisionmaking and yet be
morally obtuse or perverse. Such a rule, if sufficiently morally undesirable, negates the
moral gains of increased coordination and efficient decisionmaking.
Nonetheless, expertise, unlike the capacity to affect coordination and efficient decisionmaking, is not a function of a norm's being a rule. That is, expertise is not a matter of
whether the posited norm can settle unsettled moral questions, but is rather a function of
the wisdom of the authority who posits the norm. What is important for a norm's being a
rule is its ability to settle unsettled moral questions in a coordinated and efficient way
within the community to which the norm applies, not its ability to settle those questions
well.
"This is an important qualification. If it were not meant to settle a different controversy, the rule would be incapable of making a practical difference. The members of the
community would be left in the same spot epistemically and motivationally that they oc-
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The built-in imperfection of rules.

To the extent that Lex's rules are general and determinate,
they will not always correspond to the results of ideal particularistic reasoning. That is, a particularistic decisionmaker will come
to conclusions about what moral principles demand in concrete
cases that differ from what general rules would require or permit
in some of those cases. A particularistic reasoner might conclude
correctly that he should not exceed fifty miles per hour on one
stretch of road but that he should drive sixty on another. The
general rule "Drive fifty-five" will permit him to exceed the morally optimal speed in some instances and require him to drive
more slowly than the morally optimal speed in others.
This feature of general rules-this bluntness and the resulting over and underinclusiveness relative to background moral
principles-stems from rules being what Fred Schauer calls "entrenched generalizations."3 The fifty-five miles per hour speed
limit generalizes over an indefinite number of particular occasions for driving; it functioris as if one should infer that fifty-five
is the optimal speed on every occasion. And that generalization
about optimal speed is "entrenched" because "Drive fifty-five" is
an authoritative rule-it is meant to supplant the controversial
background moral principles for members of the community in
deciding how fast to drive. Only if the members consult the rule
and ignore the background moral principles in deciding what to
do-even if those principles appear to conflict with the rule in the
case at hand-can the rule deliver the coordination, expertise,
and efficiency it is there to provide.
This bluntness of general rules is therefore both morally desirable and morally problematic. Once Lex is forced by his limitations to promulgate general rules rather than on-the-spot commands, his rules will be blunt norms in the way described because only then can they solve the problems of particularismlack of coordination, mistakes, and inefficient decisionmaking.
But the very bluntness that enables Lex's rules to solve these probcupied in the absence of the rule. See Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart's Way Out, 4 Legal Theory
469, 494-95 (1998). See also Anthony J. Sebok, Legal Positivism in American Jurisprudence 256-66, 307-12 (Cambridge 1998).
" Of course, what makes such moral and evaluative terms determinate and thus employable in rules is the "social fact' of agreement on their concrete applications. One might
say that whatever their true referents, it is their conventional meanings-social factsthat the rules are employing. Members of the community do not need to be correct about
the meaning of "reasonable farmer." They need only be consistent with each other.
Schauer, Playing by the Rules at 31-35 (cited in note 9) (over and underinclusion),
38-39 (entrenchment), 42-45 (entrenchment), 49-50 (entrenchment and over and underinclusion), 84 (entrenchment), 87 (entrenchment).
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lems of particularism will also mean that the results they dictate
will diverge from those that particularism, applied correctly,
would dictate. In other words, blunt rules will be morally flawed
even when they are morally desirable. Optimal decision procedures will not mimic the criteria of moral correctness infallibly
applied.
It is important not to be misled into thinking that rules'
moral flaws can be eliminated by having a better set of rules in
terms of content. So long as the members of our community are
finite in their knowledge and reasoning capacities-so long as
they are human beings-the best posited norms for them will be
blunt rules. Put differently, for a community with the normal
human limitations, a good set of blunt rules will be preferable to
particularism and its attendant controversies and uncertainties.
But even the best set of blunt rules will produce outcomes at odds
with correct particularistic reasoning."
This paradoxical aspect of authoritative rules-the fact that
such rules are simultaneously morally optimal and morally
suboptimal-and the decisionmaking conundra this paradox engenders will be taken up extensively in Part III. My purpose here
is merely to show how rules' paradoxical nature is a function of
their entrenching and generalizing nature.

The moral function of Lex's rules, as well as the rule "Let Lex
decide," is to solve the problems caused by controversy and uncertainty over the application of moral principles. Lex's rules can fulfill their function only if they are determinate rules, not indeterminate standards.32 And given Lex's human limitations, the rules
can fulfill their function only if they are general and relatively
blunt, which means that they will diverge in application from the
moral principles they aim to serve.

Indeed, even if Lex were able to decide each particular controversy as it arose, and
did not therefore need to promulgate any rules, he would occasionally make errors. In
those cases, the one general rule in the community--"Let Lex decide"-would entrench a
generalization that produced results in the cases of Lex's errors at odds with the background moral principles. This is not to say that "Let Lex decide" would not be the best rule
available, nor is it to say that the rule would be inferior to pure particularism.
"2See Shapiro, 4 Legal Theory at 494-95 (cited in note 28).
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C. The Problem to Which Law Is a Solution Is Not That Men
Are Not Angels, But That They Are Not Gods
I have assumed a community of morally motivated people
whose problem is that they are uncertain or disagree about what
morality dictates in a host of concrete cases. Uncertainty and
disagreement generate the moral costs of lack of coordination,
lack of expertise, and inefficiency. If they are more determinate
than the moral principles that they are meant to resolve, rules
both constituting authorities and promulgated by authorities can
reduce or eliminate such moral costs. Law as formal rules is a
solution to the problem of the limits of moral knowledge.
To see why it is lack of information, not immoral motivation,
that gives rise to the need for formalistic law, imagine a different
hypothetical community. In this one, everyone can apply moral
principles unerringly in concrete cases. Its problem is that some
members are not motivated to comply with those moral principles.
In this community, there would be no need for posited norms.
Morality would be self-sufficient. If some members violated their
moral obligations, morality itself would instruct the remaining
members how they should investigate, try, and punish the offenders. Remember, everyone can apply moral principles correctly
in concrete cases. And there is no reason that morality cannot extend beyond its first-order requirements and speak to how to
treat miscreants. Indeed, moral theory regarding crime and punishment and moral theory regarding adjudication are just aspects
of moral theory generally.'
Thus, if men were gods-morally omniscient-but not angels-not motivated morally-morality would be an adequate
guide to behavior and posited norms would be unnecessary. If,
however, men were angels but not gods, then posited norms in
the form of determinate rules would be necessary to implement
morality. Formalistic law is a solution to a cognitive, not a motivational, problem.'

' The moral theory of what to criminalize and what justifies criminal punishment is,
of course, a well-established department of moral theory. Somewhat less well-established
is the moral theory of adjudicative procedures. But that does not mean moral theorizing
about such procedures is unheard of. See, for example, Larry Alexander, Are Procedural
Rights Derivative Substantive Rights?, 17 L & Phil 19, 19-36 (1998).
' See Gregory S. Kavka, Why Even Morally Perfect People Would Need Government,
12 Soc Phil & Pol 1 (1995).
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D. The Worthlessness of Nonformal, Moralized Legal Norms:
The Case of the "Justice-Seeking Constitution"
If law is a response to moral uncertainty and disagreement
rather than to immoral motivation, then law that is nonformalthat incorporates or refers to moral principles whose applications
are uncertain or contentious-serves no function. That is, laws
that direct people to be fair or just, or to do what is right and
honorable, tell people no more than they already know. We do not
need to be told through some posited norm that we should do
what is right. We know that. What we need to be told is what
course of action is right.
Private law-and a large portion of the public regulations
that modify private law-is generally rather formal. That is, it
consists largely of rules that are, in most of their applications,
quite determinate. Because we operate in a complex, highly interdependent market economy, a high degree of formality is absolutely essential.
It is no less necessary for public law, including constitutional
law, to be formal than it is for private law. Structural provisions
of the Constitution-those specifying who is a legislator, a president, or a justice of the Supreme Court, or how a bill becomes
law, and so forth-must surely be formal.' And what is true of
the structural provisions is also true of constitutional rights.
Telling legislators that they must comply with "fundamental
fairness" and the morally correct conception of "equality" tells
them nothing they do not already know. A 'justice-seeking Constitution"3-one that is to be "interpreted" to instantiate the correct theory of justice-and similar such notions, like Dworkin's
"morally best constitution that it can be"3 are useless. They
leave us with the very uncertainties and controversies that law,
including constitutional law, is meant to resolve. A constitution
that says no more than "be just and wise in governing" is a complete waste of paper.' And so, too, is a constitution that appears
more specific because it contains a number of discrete injunctions-such as "do not abridge freedom of speech," "do not deprive
Imagine deciding whether someone was "President" based on a nonformal standard
such as whether that person is best qualified to bring about justice and good government
rather than based on the formal rule, "He who gets the most electoral votes wins."
See Christopher L. Eisgruber and Lawrence G. Sager, Good Constitutions and Bad
Choices, in William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Sanford Levinson, eds, ConstitutionalStupidities,
ConstitutionalTragediesch 27 (NYU 1998).
Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 53 (Belknap 1986).
See Larry Alexander, Constitutional Tragedies and Giving Refuge to the Devil, in
Eskridge and Levinson, eds, ConstitutionalStupidities ch 23 (cited in note 36).
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any person of equal protection of the laws," and so forth-but under which we are directed to interpret those injunctions not as
formal rules, but as standards that refer us to whatever is the
correct political/moral theory. 9
III. THE DILEMMA OF FORMALISTIC LAW40
Authoritative rules that are promulgated by and meant to
improve the moral condition of human beings of finite reasoning
and informational capacities will always fail to capture precisely
the requirements of morality. Sometimes the rules will require
act A where morality requires not-A. Sometimes the rules will fail
to require act A where morality does require it.
This over and underinclusiveness of authoritative rules relative to their background moral reasons is a product of what
Schauer calls the entrenched generalization characteristic of
rules.4 Rules of necessity generalize. And if they did not "entrench" the generalization-if they could be disregarded whenever the generalization was deemed inapt-they would devolve
into the mere rules of thumb of particularism. True rules-the
kind our hypothetical society needs-or what Postema calls
"proper rules" 2 and I have elsewhere called "serious rules,"4 3 will
of necessity be over and underinclusive relative to their background moral reasons.
Nevertheless, even though the best rules will be somewhat
over and underinclusive and will thus, if followed, result in some
morally regrettable acts and consequences, the moral gains from
rules may still outweigh their moral costs.
Rules are thus morally desirable. Put differently, it is morally desirable that the subjects of rules, when determining how
they should act in particular cases, should reason directly from
the rules rather than from the moral reasons that lie behind the
Interpretations of constitutional provisions-and of legal norms generally-that
construe them as heavily moralized standards essentially read those provisions to be delegations of decisionmaking authority from one institutional decisionmaker (for example,
the framers) to another (for example, the Supreme Court). In that sense, they accomplish
something, although they do so only insofar as they are rules regarding decisionmaking
institutions rather than standards for decisions. This is how I respond to my commentators, especially Professor Pildes, who believe I overstate this point. See Richard H. Pildes,
Forms ofFormalism, 66 U Chi L Rev 607, 614 (1999).
' The following Part is more fully elaborated in Alexander and Sherwin, Past Imperfect at ch 5 (cited in note 3).
Schauer, Playingby the Rules at 47-52 (cited in note 9).
"Gerald J. Postema, Positivism, I Presume?... Comments on Schauer's "Rules and
the Rule of Law", 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol 797, 801 (1991).
' Larry Alexander and Emily Sherwin, The Deceptive Nature ofRules, 142 U Pa L Rev
1191, 1198 (1994). See also Part II.B.1.
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rules. When the background moral reasons direct the subject to
act one way, and the rules-based on the same background moral
reasons-direct the subject to act another, we end up with what I
call 'the gap." We want the authorities to promulgate opaque, serious rules: specifically, we want rules that do not contain blanket exceptions for the inevitable cases where they conflict with
background moral reasons; otherwise the exceptions would convert serious rules into mere rules of thumb. But when, as subjects
of the rules, we believe the rules conflict with the background
moral reasons that are the rules' raison d'etre, what possible reason do we have to comply with the rules rather than morality as
we perceive it?
As I put the matter in the article in which I first coined the
phrase "the gap" to describe this problem:
There is an always-possible gap between what we have reason to do, all things considered..., and what we have reason to have our rules (and the officials who promulgate and
enforce them) require us to do. A rule may not allow for an
exception where, all things considered, we should violate it,
and yet be an ideal rule for all that. We may not trust others-really, ourselves in the role of the rule-followers rather
than rule-authors--to apply the exception correctly. In other
words, an exception may lead to an unfavorable balance of
incorrect versus correct applications of the exception. But
without the exception, we end up with "the gap."44
Schauer describes the same phenomenon as the "asymmetry
of authority."4" He asserts that those subject to rules are irrational and immoral if they do not follow the background moral
reasons when those reasons conflict with authoritative rules.
It does not follow, however, that it is rational for the creator
of a decisionmaking environment to encourage that freedom
of decisionmaking. Thus, I want to focus on the phenomenon
of the asymmetry of authority,the way in which the irrationality or immorality of imposing authority does not necessarily result from the (stipulated) irrationality or immorality of
succumbing to that authority.
The argument for the asymmetry of authority is quite simple. Consistent with my assumptions, suppose that deference

Larry Alexander, The Gap, 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol 695, 695-96 (1991).
Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol 645, 692-93
(1991).
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to authority in any strong sense is irrational and potentially
immoral. Suppose, however, that it is also the case... that
there is reason to suspect that a given decisionmaker or array of decisionmakers will make more errors, and consequently more immoral decisions, if allowed to make a decision on the basis of what she thinks is the balance of reasons
than if compelled to make decisions only within a certain,
much narrower range. In those circumstances, it seems plain
that the moral designer of a decisionmaking environment
has a moral responsibility to design that environment in
such a way as to minimize the number of moral mistakes. If
this is so, then just as it is rational and moral for a decisionmaker to reach the result she thinks best, then so too is
it just as rational and moral for the designer of a decisionmaking environment to prevent her from doing so.46
Even if "the gap" or "asymmetry of authority" is the inevitable consequence of proper reasoning about how to avert the moral
costs of moral disagreement and mistake, it is nonetheless quite
threatening. It suggests that we may not be able to have what we
need-authorities and authoritative rules-because however rational it is to establish them, it is irrational to follow them. Even
the morally motivated may find themselves doomed to a Hobbesian state of affairs by their own rationality. It becomes of overweening importance to the moral enterprise of establishing legal
order to explore strategies for closing "the gap."
In a recent article I explored several such strategies and
found them all to be problematic.47 The strategies are rule sensitive particularism ("RSP"), presumptive positivism ("PP"), consent, punishment, exclusionary reasons, and deception. RSP
would have people follow rules unless the reasons for following
the rules-including the reasons for choosing rules over particularism and the rule-undermining effects of rule violation-are
outweighed by the reasons against following the rules. In the article I attempted to demonstrate that RSP collapses into pure
particularism and converts serious, opaque rules into mere rules
48
of thumb.
Under PP, those subject to the rule must follow it unless the
reasons against following it exceed the reasons in favor of following it by some specified weight. I attempted to demonstrate

Id at 692.
' Larry Alexander, Can Law Survive the Asymmetry of Authority?, 18 Quinnipaic L
Rev (forthcoming 1998).
"Id.
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that PP either does not eliminate "the gap" or collapses into
RSP.49
Neither consent to formal rules nor their democratic pedigree
can eliminate 'the gap." "The gap" arises because an exceptionless rule may be morally optimal even though, for one subject to
the rule, rule violation may be morally prescribed. But if rule
violation is morally prescribed, one cannot escape that moral prescription by consenting to, promising to abide by, or democratically authorizing an exceptionless rule. One cannot in any morally effective way consent to immorality.
Punishment of morally justified rule violations is another
strategy that I conclude is incapable of closing "the gap," for both
psychological and moral reasons.' It is both psychologically difficult and morally problematic to punish those who have violated
rules for morally sufficient reasons, even if punishment is necessary to produce the very consequences that will morally justify
the rule violation. Moreover, the directive to officials to punish
morally justified rule violators is itself a rule that the officials
might believe can on occasion be justifiably disobeyed, thus creating a new "gap." And punishment cannot close that "gap" without creating an infinite regress of punishing the punishers of
punishers ....
The exclusionary reasons claim is essentially a denial of "the
gap." The argument is that rules are reasons for acting (in accordance with their terms) and also reasons not to act on other reasons, including the reasons that stand behind the rule. This argument is mistaken. Rules are opaque to the moral reasons that
stand behind them, but those reasons continue to exist for those
subject to the rules. And their existence is what creates "the
51
gap."
Deception about the moral status of serious rules-in other
words, teaching those subject to rules that "the gap" does not exist-is also problematic. There is the vertiginous practical diffi-

Id.
Id.
s' A somewhat similar strategy is one that claims that accepting a rule entails a commitment to it, which by virtue of making rule violation infeasible as a matter of intention
entails the rationality of following the rule according to its terms. See Scott J. Shapiro,
Rules and PracticalReasoning (unpublished manuscript on file with U Chi L Rev); Scott
J. Shapiro, The Difference That Rules Make, in Brian Bix, ed, Analyzing Law: New Essays
in Legal Theory 33-62 (Clarendon 1998). I believe that this strategy either relies on a mysterious constraint that rules exert on the will or relocates "the gap" at the point of rule acceptance rather than at the point of rule compliance. For how can we rationally and morally "accept" a rule that will commit us to conduct that we now regard as irrational and
immoral?
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culty of who gets to deceive whom. And, of course, there is the
moral problem, namely, whether deception, even if for moral
ends, is morally justifiable.
In the end, I remain skeptical that we have a solution to "the
gap." I have no doubt that "the gap" exists. Its manifestations are
ubiquitous in the law: our ambivalence about rules that stand in
the way of worthy substantive goals (that "provid[e] the Devil
with refuge" 2 ); the synchronic battles between rules-oriented
majorities and standards-oriented dissenters (and vice versa); the
diachronic doctrinal shifts from rules to standards to rules and so
on; the historic tension between law and equity, between letter
and spirit; the tension between procedural regularity and substantive correctness,' which has parallels within law to the relation between legal rules generally and their background moral
principles, as well as the procedure versus substance dilemma in
the rules governing lawyering, which appear to dictate unjust behavior for the sake of overall legal justice. If "the gap" existsand if it is an inevitable product of formal rules, which in turn are
the essence of law-then the absence of a successful strategy for
eliminating it calls into question the very possibility of law itself.
If we are clear-headed about what formality entails, then however morally desirable a system of formal rules-that is, lawmay be, we may not be able to achieve it. Or, put differently, law
may be available only for those who do not fully comprehend its
nature.
IV. THE NONFORMALISTIC NATURE OF MORALITY

I have argued that law is essentially formalistic, and that
law's formalistic nature results in a practical dilemma for those
subject to it. Here I argue that in complete contrast to law, morality is thoroughly nonformalistic. To understand that claim,
however, requires that we first understand what its denial entails.

" See Alexander, ConsitutionalTragedies and GivingRefuge at 117 (cited in note 38).

Compare the recent U.S. Supreme Court case declaring actual innocence to be immaterial to the legality of a conviction with the recent California Supreme Court case declaring actual innocence to be material to a claim of defense lawyer malpractice. Herrerav
Collins, 506 US 390 (1993) (holding that claim of actual innocence based on new evidence
is not grounds for federal habeas relief); Wiley v County of San Diego, 79 Cal Rptr 2d 672,
966 P2d 983 (1998) (holding that a former criminal defendant must prove his actual innocence to prevail on a legal malpractice claim).
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The View That Morality is Formalistic

No one disputes that consequentialist moralities such as
utilitarianism, welfare-equalization, and the like are nonformalistic. That is, according to those moralities, whatever action produces the morally mandated state of affairs just is the morally
right action to take, no matter what one's motivation and no matter the character of the action involved. Of course, consequentialist morality may prescribe actions designed to alter one's
character and motivations, and it may prescribe decision procedures such as following formalistic rules. Indeed, the last point
was the topic of the previous Part of this Article. Ultimately,
however, what makes an action morally right according to consequentialist moralities is not whether it conforms to formalistic
rules or procedures, but whether it produces those consequences
deemed desirable by the particular consequentialist theory.
If one is a deontologist, however, consequences are not all
that matters morally. The character of one's actions and the motivations with which they are taken may make a moral difference
as well. Indeed, in a recent book,' Leo Katz makes the claim that
formalism in law is not primarily a product of law's indirect consequentalist function (the function of producing better moral consequences by following determinate posited rules rather than
moral principles). Although Katz concedes that some of the formalism in law reflects that function, he maintains that a lot ofperhaps most-formalism in law mirrors formalism in morality.
In other words, Katz believes that morality is deontological, and
that its deontological nature is manifested in its consisting of
formalistic rules-rules that formalistic legal rules implement directly rather than indirectly. These moral rules are formalistic in
the sense that, so long as they are complied with, one is morally
"safe," even if one knows that compliance will bring about results
that morality itself otherwise condemns, and even if one complies
solely in order to bring about those very results. Indeed, without
ever contravening a moral rule, a clever actor can arrange matters in order to bring about results that morality forbids him to
bring about through other means. Just as formal legal rules provide actors with a legally safe harbor, for Katz, formal moral
rules-which many legal rules are meant to mirror-provide actors with a morally safe harbor.'
Katz calls the achievement of otherwise forbidden ends
through proper means "avoision," a neologism he coins out of
'

Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains (cited in note 1).
Id at 52-59.
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"avoidance" and "evasion."' His novel view is that avoision works
not just in law but in the moral universe that law reflects.' For
Katz, the morality of many acts is determined by the form of
those acts rather than by the actual effects produced or the state
of mind of the actor. That neither consequences nor states of
mind fully determine the morality of acts is what creates the possibility for avoision, the moral equivalent of having one's cake
and eating it too.
Thus, according to Katz, if a deontological theory of morality
condemns harvesting one healthy person's organs to save five
dying persons, but does not condemn diverting a trolley from a
track where it will kill five persons to a track where it will kill
one, it will be possible for the determined organ harvester to
achieve his otherwise immoral goal in a morally permissible
manner if he somehow can convert a "harvest" situation into a
"trolley" situation." Or, if morality condemns private execution of
those disposed to violence but does not condemn the use of deadly
force in self-defense, it is morally permissible for Charles Bronson
to walk in Central Park at night for the sole purpose of enticing
violently disposed persons to attack him so that he can, in turn,
kill them in self-defense.59
For Katz, who comes down squarely on the side of the deontologists, the way we bring about desired results affects our moral
responsibility for those results, and because of this we can bring
them about in ways that leave us morally unscathed. Deontological morality, therefore, allows avoision, and avoision in law is as
likely to reflect avoision in morality as it is to reflect the difficulty
of drafting the perfect rule. By portraying deontological morality
as full of Jesuitical formalism," Katz leaves himself open to the
internalist rejoinder, "If this is what morality is like, then why
should anyone care about it?" Of course, Katz may be an externalist, simply reporting grim news from the moral front and not
prescribing, but I doubt it. The tone of Katz's book is that it is a

" Id at x (avoision refers to "practices[ ] hovering in the limbo between legitimate
avoidance and illegitimate evasion").
Id at 16-30.

See id at 56-57.
See Death Wish (Paramount 1974) (Bronson as a mild-mannered businessman who
turns into a silent vigilante after his wife is killed and his daughter is put into a coma by a
group ofjeering thugs). Katz uses a similar example. Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains at 30-32 (cited
in note 1).
' The Jesuits made it "easy to be a good Christian by telling sinners how to circumvent their moral obligations." Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains at 25 (cited in note 1). For examples
of Jesuitical formalism, see id at 25-30.
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good thing-in an action-commending sense-that law reflects
the formalism of morality.
Are deontological moralities necessarily formalistic in the
Jesuitical sense? I must confess that I do not see why that is so.
Of course, all moral theories, even fully consequentialist ones,
rest on bedrock principles that function as axioms. Every moral
theory will be formalistic at its core, in the sense that no further
substantive grounds can be adduced in support of those bedrock
principles. But this is not the kind of formalism Katz has in mind
when he invokes Jesuitical casuistry. Rather, he appears to be
arguing that deontological moralities resist classifying all possible actions in terms of the basic values those moralities express,
and instead classify at least some actions on the basis of factors
unrelated to those basic values. If so, then I submit he has not
proved his case.
B. The Nonformalistic View of Morality: The
Nonappropriation Norm
There are, of course, all kinds of moral theories that one
might describe as at least partially deontological or nonconsequentialist. There are Kantian theories based on respect for others as ends in themselves.61 Then there are theories that reflect
some balancing of impartial concern for others' welfare and partiality towards one's own well-being and projects.2 I see no reason
to expect any of these deontological moralities to generate Katzlike formalisms, although they undoubtedly contain difficult linedrawing problems to the extent that they contain both elements
of consequentialism and nonconsequentialist-based rights.
A third set of deontological moral theories, sufficiently similar in many respects to the libertarian Kantian theories that they
might be labeled neo-Kantian, are those built around what I shall
"IThese Kantian theories come in a variety of versions, from the quite libertarian to
the relatively nonlibertarian. See, for example, Bruce A. Ackerman, Social Justice in the
Liberal State (Yale 1980) (assuming an ambiguous position with respect to whether bodies, labor, and talents are protected by side constraints); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice
(Belknap 1971) (same); Nozick, Anarchy (cited in note 6) (promoting Kantian libertarianism). See also Larry Alexander, Liberalism as Neutral Dialogue: Man and Manna in the
Liberal State, 28 UCLA L Rev 816, 822-26 (1981) (discussing the differences among Ackerman, Rawls, and Nozick).
, See, for example, Thomas Nagel, Equality and Partiality(Oxford 1991). Compare
Samuel Scheffier, The Rejection of Consequentialism:A PhilosophicalInvestigation of the
Considerations UnderlyingRival Moral Conceptions (Clarendon 1982) (advocating a nondeontological balancing of personal and impersonal perspectives); with Larry A. Alexander, Scheffler on the Independence of Agent-centered Prerogativesfrom Agent-centered Restrictions,84 J Phil 277 (1987) (arguing that Scheffier's approach of necessity results in
deontological side constraints).
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refer to as the nonappropriation norm: Do not appropriate another's existence without her consent to make yourself better off
than you would be had she not existed, and her worse off than she
would be had you not existed. 3 These theories might divide over
whether the forbidden appropriation includes only appropriation

of another's body, labor, or talent, or whether it extends to beliefmediated pleasure and distress as well,' so that, for example, it
might enjoin building spite fences and similar exploitation of psy-

chic vulnerability.'
Does the nonappropriation norm itself generate Katz-like
formalisms? Again, I do not see why this should be so. Rather
than just assert that this sort of deontological morality can avoid
the formalistic distinctions that Katz finds endemic to deontology,
however, I shall turn to exploring how well the nonappropriation
norm handles some of Katz's (and my own) examples nonformalistically.
The nonappropriation norm explains the distinction between
redirecting a runaway trolley so that it kills one rather than five
and carving up one healthy person in order to harvest his organs
for the benefit of five dying persons. The trolley case involves interaction, not appropriation. With interaction, no one is made
better off than she would have been had those made worse off not
existed.' The organ-harvesting case is paradigmatic appropriation.
See, for example, F.M. Kamm, 2 Rights, Duties, andStatus: Morality,Mortality 27980 (Oxford 1996). Thomas Nagel has recently endorsed a nonappropriation deontology
similar to Kamm's. See Thomas Nagel, PersonalRights and Public Space, 24 Phil & Pub
Aff 83 (1995).
"See, for example, Judith Jarvis Thomson, The Realm of Rights 254-55 (Harvard
1990) (rejecting rights against belief-mediated distress).
" All nonappropriation theories would leave a large domain of action governed by
purely consequentialist considerations. Thus, the interactions of X and Y, where either X
or Y or both will be worse off than they would be had the other not existed-for example,
where X wishes to play rock music and Y wishes to sleep, or where X and Y both wish to
use the same natural resources-must be governed by consequentialist norms because
they do not involve appropriation. These consequentialist norms might be implemented by
indirect consequentalist methods-formalistic rules of law or conventions that will be over
and underinclusive and draw somewhat arbitrary lines-but this is not the kind of inherent moral formalism Katz seeks to reveal. Although it would be a major theoretical task to
.mesh" the nonappropriation norm with the consequentialist norms, I see no reason to expect Katz-like formalisms to pop up at the interface of these two moral domains.
0 I should acknowledge that there is a version of the trolley case that is devilishly difficult for the nonappropriation norm. In this version, the trolley tracks divide at point A
and rejoin at point B. The five potential victims are on the track past point B, while the
trolley has not yet reached point A. If the trolley goes down the left branch it will kill the
five. If, on the other hand, it goes down the right branch, it will not kill the five, but only
because it will kill one victim on that branch and will be stopped by the victim's body. If
the victim were not on the right branch, the trolley would continue to and beyond point B
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What of the person who fails to rescue another so that he can
then harvest the latter's organs? Katz says this conduct is morally permissible because of its form-nonrescue 7 He is correct
about permissibility, but the conduct is permissible because it
does not involve appropriation. The victim is not worse off than
had the exploiter not existed. The explanation is substantive, not
formal.
Perhaps Katz and I agree in the sense that what I am calling
a substantive distinction between appropriation and nonappropriation is, to him, a formalistic one. After all, the line between
killing and not saving does seem morally insignificant to many,
particularly consequentialists, but also to nonlibertarian deontologists. Nonetheless, if one regards nonappropriation as a core
moral value, then the distinction is as substantive as one can be.
Consider then the person who drives carefully around his enemy's neighborhood for no other reason than the infinitesimal
chance of having an "accidental" collision with his enemy.' Katz
believes that if his plan succeeds, and he accidentally kills or injures his enemy, he is morally blameless though disreputable.
But there the nonappropriation norm again declares, contra Katz,
that the conduct is morally wrong. The reasons why conduct is
engaged in are just as important to its morality as its physical
aspects. The state of mind affects wrongdoing, not just culpability. Katz's formalistic moral loophole does not exist.
To see why Katz is wrong about my hypothetical driver, consider the following two cases. In the first, Cowardly Jackal, who
has been promised millions by the O.A.S. if he assassinates DeGaulle, but who is very afraid of getting caught, takes a one-in-amillion shot at DeGaulle from atop the Eiffel Tower, a place from
which he can escape undetected. If he succeeds in killing DeGaulle with that shot, he will have committed purposeful homicide. After all, in the words of the Model Penal Code, his "conscious object" in firing is that DeGaulle be killed: 9 that is how he
will earn his reward. Also, his firing at DeGaulle does increase,

and kill the five even sooner than had it traveled down the left branch. If someone steers
the trolley to the right to save the five by killing the one, has he violated the nonappropriation norm? Has he if he merely omits to steer it away from the right branch when, had
the victim not been there, he would have steered left in order to give the five a few seconds
more to live?
'Katz, Ill-Gotten Gains at 208 (cited in note 1) ("Killing is bad, letting die is all
right.").
See Larry Alexander, Crime and Culpability, 5 J Contemp Legal Issues 1, 4 n 10
(1994).
'Model Penal Code § 2.02(2)(a)(i) (ALI 1962).
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ever so slightly over the background risk, the odds that DeGaulle
will be killed.
Now compare this version of Cowardly Jackal with a second.
Here, Cowardly Jackal does not fire a one-in-a-million shot at
DeGaulle. Rather, he daily drops a banana peel near DeGaulle's
office for the purpose of creating a one-in-a-million chance that
DeGaulle will slip on it and die. Because committing purposeful
homicide by causing someone to slip on a banana peel is neither
morally nor legally distinguishable from achieving the same end
by causing someone to get hit by a bullet, Cowardly Jackal in my
second case is in the same moral and legal boat as Cowardly
Jackal in my first case.
If this is correct, however, then my third Cowardly Jackal,
who, of course, plots to "assassinate" DeGaulle by carefully driving in his vicinity over and over, is no different from the others.
Katz might maintain that driving carefully is morally and legally
permissible, whereas firing shots and dropping banana peels are
not, but this begs the question at issue. Moreover, firing guns and
dropping banana peels are permissible, even if they increase the
risks to others beyond what I have stipulated, if undertaken for
permissible ends.
If one accepts my account of deontological morality and its
core norm of nonappropriation, then morality is not formalistic in
Katz's sense. One cannot intentionally arrange matters in order
to appropriate from others and manage to escape moral reproach
through clever avoision. One cannot do in morality what one can
do in law, namely, escape legal reproach and still achieve substantive ends that formal legal rules are meant to block. The latter is possible because the very qualities of formalistic legal rules
that allow them to achieve their moral goals of coordination, expertise, and efficiency also make them over and underinclusive
with respect to their background purposes as well as opaque to
those purposes. Those qualities create loopholes that the legally
clever can exploit. Morality-even deontological morality--contains no such "loopholes." It is thoroughly substantive, not formalistic. There is no room for "avoision."'

7" One

cannot even count as benefits in moral balancing those gains that are appro-

priative in nature. Thus, in deciding whether to switch the infamous trolley to the side
where one worker will be killed in order to save the five workers on the main track, I can
balance the lives, but I cannot take into consideration that the one worker will be killed in
a way that allows the harvesting of his organs for others' benefit.
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V. ARE FORMAL LEGAL RULES AND DEONTOLOGICAL SIDE
CONSTRAINTS COMPATIBLE?

There are three moral problems occasioned by the existence
of formal legal rules and the resultant gap between those rules
and background morality. These three moral problems arise from
the two strategies-punishment of morally justified rule violators
and deception regarding the moral status of legal rules-that
seem at all capable of closing "the gap."
First, the moral benefits of serious rules are consequentialist
in character. That is, the moral benefits stem from the rules'
bluntness relative to background morality, and bluntness results
in more averted moral errors relative to particularism than induced moral errors under the rules. This means that some who
correctly violate the rules according to pure particularism, but
who, if they are not punished, incorrectly violate the rules according to RSP, are sacrificed (punished) in order to avert a
greater number of incorrect (according to particularism) rule
violations by others.
If, however, those punished are acting in accordance with
their own or others' deontological rights, then punishing them,
though net beneficial, represents a utilitarianism of rights that is
inconsistent with rights as side constraints." For example, it is
possible that there is a strong deontological right to commit suicide under certain conditions, and that this right entails the right
to assist others and to be assisted in committing suicide. It is also
possible that permitting assisted suicide creates such dangers to
other moral rights and values-such as the right not to be killed
involuntarily-that a rule forbidding assisted suicide minimizes
rights violations overall. Those who are punished under this rule
and who are in fact exercising their moral right to assist and are
not violating others' moral rights are thus being punished not for
their violation of rights, but to minimize others' violations of
rights. In such a domain of strong deontological rights-if such a
domain exists-formal legal rules appear morally problematic."2
The second moral problem of formal legal rules is perhaps
but an instance of the first. Because those who violate rules when
71 See Nozick, Anarchy at 28-29 (cited in note 6).

Procedural legal rules as well as substantive ones (such as the rule against assisted
suicide) are also morally problematic from the standpoint of deontological side constraints.
Almost all procedural rules contemplate occasional violations of deontological rights in order to minimize rights violations overall. Thus, for example, legal rules of repose may require implementing rather than overturning procedurally regular verdicts that are nonetheless factually incorrect. The moral rights of those erroneously found liable or guilty are
violated in order to minimize such violations of others' moral rights.
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RSP so dictates are both justified and nonculpable-and because
those who violate rules when RSP appearsto so dictate are nonculpable even if unjustified-punishing these violators for the
greater moral good will be, on at least some moral theories, morally impermissible. Yet if they are not punished, then unless a
strategy of mass deception is employed, the rules will be undermined. Therefore, viable formal legal rules appear to demand
punishment of the morally nonculpable, surely a morally problematic implication for a deontologist.
The third moral problem of rules is the complement to the
second. Either the citizens or the officials who must punish for
rule violations must ultimately be deceived about the moral force
of the rules. If the citizens are not deceived, they will follow RSP
and undermine the rules unless they are punished. But punishing the morally innocent will be a psychologically unstable strategy for the officials. Moreover, it too will be the product of the
blunt legal rule directed at the officials, "Punish all rule violators." Moral deception would appear to be necessary at some
level.
Here is a possible rejoinder. The second moral problem, that
of punishing the justified and the nonculpable, can be handled
through consent. Although it is true that one cannot consent to
violating others' moral rights, one can consent to what would otherwise be a violation of his own moral rights. If that is so, then
everyone could consent to his own punishment were he to violate
serious rules, even if his violation were justified under RSP. And
if everyone consents to punishment for rule violation, the punishers are off the moral hook: they can pursue the moral goods of
formal legal rules without violating any nonwaived moral rights
of those they must punish to obtain such moral goods.
There is a difficulty with this strategy, however, if it is unaccompanied by moral deception. Punishment of the justified and
the nonculpable achieves moral goods by deterring violations of
serious rules by those who would otherwise violate them believing themselves justified by RSP. The threat of punishment will
deter such violations, however, not by introducing weighty moral
reasons against violation into the equation, but by introducing
prudentialreasons against violation. That means that the threat
of punishment works by moral corruption.73 The threat of punishment for acting as one thinks is morally correct is no different
from a bribe offered to not act as one thinks is morally correct.

" See Postema, 14 Harv J L & Pub Pol at 819-22 (cited in note 42).
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If I am correct that punishment can by itself shore up serious
rules only by corrupting, then punishment as "the gap" closer is
surely morally problematic, even if everyone consents to it.
Moreover, the most virtuous will be undeterred by the threat of
punishment unless the punishment threatened is so draconian
that it changes the moral calculus and rule compliance becomes
morally demanded by RSP. (If the severity of the threatened
punishment permitted, but did not demand, rule compliance, the
morally virtuous might violate the rules in a spirit of morally supererogatory self-sacrifice.) But a rule requiring officials to impose draconian punishments on the justified and/or nonculpable,
even buttressed by the consent of the punished, will be a rule
that, unsupported by punishment of noncomplying officials, most
likely will collapse. 4
CONCLUSION

Formal legal rules offer the prospect of moral gains. The
more complex and diverse the society, the greater the moral gains
serious rules can achieve. The question is whether in light of "the
gap"--and its associated practical and moral problems-formal
rules are a possibility for us, at least so long as we can see clearly
what "the gap" entails.
The mere fact that we can make moral gains by having formal rules and that therefore it is rational for us to want formal
rules does not mean it is rational for us to have them. Rationality
itself may preclude our having formal rules. Formal rules may be
like "the intention to drink the vile potion tomorrow" in Gregory
Kavka's "toxin puzzle." 5 Although it would be rational to want to
intend tonight to drink the potion tomorrow-because, in Kavka's
story, an intention tonight guarantees a lot of money tonight-we
may be unable (so long as we are rational) actually to form the in-

" Perhaps we can consent to automatically imposed punishments that are so draconian as to make rule compliance morally mandatory, even in situations that would otherwise fall into "the gap." In a world of morally fallible rule makers, however, automatic
punishment devices would be extremely dangerous technological fixes to the problem of
"the gap." The same is true of other similar schemes, such as having draconian harms
automatically imposed on innocent people whenever a rule is violated for moral reasonsor perhaps for moral reasons of less than a certain weight (an automatic form of presumptive positivism).
" Gregory Kavka, The Toxin Puzzle, 43 Analysis 33 (1983). For recent commentary on
Kavka's puzzle and its implications, see David Gauthier, Rethinking the Toxin Puzzle, in
Jules L. Coleman and Christopher W. Morris, eds, Rational Commitment and Social Justice 47-58 (Cambridge 1998); Michael E. Bratman, Toxin, Temptation, and the Stability of
Intention,in Coleman and Morris, eds, Rational Commitment 59-83; Gilbert Harman, The
Toxin Puzzle, in Coleman and Morris, eds, Rational Commitment 84-89.
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tention to drink the potion, given that we know it will be irrational for us to drink it tomorrow.
Formal rules may be analogous. Just as with promising and
its benefits in a society comprised entirely of utilitarian maximizers, so long as we see the true nature of formal rules-and thus
"the gap" that undermines their normativity-we may be unable
to establish them, no matter how much we lose morally without
them.
The concept of law is bound up with the existence of formal
rules. Surely the benefits of law are synonymous with the benefits of formal rules. If that is the case, then the impossibility of
formal rules means in the most important sense the impossibility
of law.

